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The effects of reason and event saliency on health-related decisions
Abstract
The current study examined how event saliency and reason for action influence the amount of regret
anticipated about a foregone option, and on people‟s anticipated choice of behavior when they are
confronted with a choice between two equally aversive options. The participants were 120 undergraduate
psychology students. Participants who were prompted to imagine choosing to fulfill an internal desire
instead of an internal obligation anticipated significantly more regret than those who were prompted to
make the opposite choice. No significant differences in the amount of regret anticipated was found
between participants who had to choose between two external obligations. Interestingly, participants
were not more likely to choose an action which would have avoided a salient outcome, when imagining
actually being in the situation. These findings were interpreted to suggest dissociation between people‟s
anticipated emotions and subsequent choice of action regarding important preventative health behavior.
The implications for health promotion campaigns are discussed.
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Abstract
The current study examined how event saliency and
reason for action influence the amount of regret
anticipated about a foregone option, and on people’s
anticipated choice of behavior when they are confronted
with a choice between two equally aversive options. The
participants were 120 undergraduate psychology
students. Participants who were prompted to imagine
choosing to fulfill an internal desire instead of an internal
obligation anticipated significantly more regret than
those who were prompted to make the opposite choice.
No significant differences in the amount of regret
anticipated was found between participants who had to
choose between two external obligations. Interestingly,
participants were not more likely to choose an action
which would have avoided a salient outcome, when
imagining actually being in the situation. These findings
were interpreted to suggest dissociation between
people’s anticipated emotions and subsequent choice of
action regarding important preventative health behavior.
The implications for health promotion campaigns are
discussed.

Introduction
Counterfactual thinking involves thoughts of “what if”
or “if only” after an event has occurred, allowing us to
consider alternative versions of reality- how an event
could have turned out better or worse. Counterfactual
thoughts are comprised of an antecedent (e.g., “If only I
had done X…”) and an outcome (“…Y would have
never happened”). Hence, engaging in upward
counterfactual thinking (i.e., where one compares what
has happened with a more desirable outcome) has been
shown to help people learn from their mistakes by
allowing the identification of events and/or actions that
caused a particular outcome, thus highlighting how to
avoid them in the future (Roese, 1994).
A concept related to counterfactual thinking is
anticipated regret which involves imagining how much
regret would be felt following an imagined,
unfavourable future event (Bell, 1982; Zeelenberg,
Beattie, ven der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). Studies have
shown that anticipating future negative affect caused by
a choice to engage in a particular behaviour can
decrease the likelihood that the individual will engage
in this behaviour in the future, as they will want to

minimise the chances of experiencing this regret (Page
& Colby, 2003). Janis and Mann (1977) have referred
to this process as ‘vigilant decision making’. They
purport that anticipating regret makes people more
attentive to their surroundings, and makes them think
more carefully and elaborately about their
circumstances, creating stronger attitudes and
improving decision-making processes.
Paradigms
in
experiments
which
assess
counterfactual and anticipated regret commonly require
participants to imagine a hypothetical scenario in which
a choice was made and a negative outcome resulted.
Other paradigms require participants to choose between
two potential outcomes where a negative outcome
resulted from this choice, making the outcome more
salient. However, in most studies one of the two
potential outcomes is obviously a bad outcome and the
other obviously good. Naturally, when deciding
between two alternatives, we most often choose the
option which we believe will elicit the least amount of
regret. Paradigms that are comprised of one bad
outcome and a default ‘good’ option limit the
interpretability of the effects of counterfactual thoughts
and thoughts of anticipated regret on decision making
and behaviour. Such paradigms do not directly
manipulate the anticipation of counterfactual regret; this
regret is instead influenced by the framing of the
decision or the decision itself (Hetts, Boninger, Armor,
Gleicher & Nathanson, 2000). Hence, thoughts of
anticipated counterfactual regret may only be able to
influence choices when such a default ‘good’ outcome
is available (Simonson, 1992). Such paradigms may
also have limited ecological validity as they don’t
consider how decisions may be made when competing
motivational factors are present, and a choice has to be
made between two alternatives. To address these issues
Hetts, et al. (2000) conducted a study which examined
how anticipated regret influences decision making and
behaviour when one of two equally aversive outcomes
is made salient. In their study participants were
instructed to imagine they had arrived at college for an
important exam. On their way to the exam they realised
they may have forgotten to lock their car door. They
were either told that they went back to check their car
which was locked and they consequently performed
poorly on the exam (‘exam regret’) or they went to the
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exam to later go back to their car to find it had been
broken into (‘car regret’). Participants were required to
indicate whether they would have gone to check their
car or to go straight to class for the exam. Results
showed that participants induced to imagine a future
regret were more likely to choose behaviours that
would avoid the experience of that regret. That is,
participants in the car regret condition were more likely
to say that they would have gone back to check their
car, and vice versa for the exam regret condition. This
study demonstrates that anticipatory counterfactual
thoughts may still be generated when there is no
alternative, ‘good’ option available, and that other
factors (such as event saliency) may be used to evaluate
the situation and to make such decisions.
Apart from event saliency, another factor shown to
influence decision making and behaviour is reason for
action. Walsh and Byrne (2007) have shown that if the
reason for a person’s action was out of obligation (for
example, in compliance with societal rules and/or
norms); they are less likely to think in a counterfactual
manner following an adverse event. This is because
these types of reasons are seen as less mutable and
alterations to the choice of action as not permissible.
However, if the reason for a person’s action was in
order to serve their own desires or goals, then people
tend to think of more possible counterfactual outcomes
following an adverse event. This is because these
desires are seen as more changeable, and alternative
outcomes more permissible.
In the experiment to be reported in this paper, we
explored how event saliency and reason for action in
combination may influence the amount of regret
anticipated about a foregone option, and on people’s
anticipated choice of behaviour in a health-related
context. The boundaries between personal desires and
obligations can be unclear at times as one may be
motivated to engage in a behaviour not only because
they are obliged to but also because they want to. The
current experiment examined the effects on regret and
behaviour when a clear comparison between these
different types of reasons is made. The information
gained from this study may allow insight into how
people make decisions in complex circumstances. This
is of particular importance in health-related contexts as
this information can be used in campaign messages to
persuade people to take better care of their health and
engage in preventative health checks- particularly in
skin cancer preventative checks. While primary
prevention of this disease (i.e., preventing cancer by
employing protective behaviours, such as using
sunscreen, and avoiding the sun) is of extreme
importance, secondary prevention measures (i.e.,
preventing symptoms that have already developed from
worsening) are just as vital. In fact, it is estimated that
over one third of all fatal cancer cases could be
prevented by making lifestyle changes and many more
could be effectively treated (and far more cost-

effectively) if they were detected early (Cancer Council
Australia, 2009). While many contemporary campaigns
focus on the primary prevention of skin cancer, fewer
of these address the issues and barriers preventing
people from going to get their skin examined by a
professional, after having identified a suspicious growth
or change on their skin.
We modified the paradigm used by Hetts et al. (2000)
so that it was obvious the salient outcome was caused
by choosing to fulfill either an internal desire or an
obligation. To further examine this concept the choice
between the two adverse outcomes was either between
an internal desire and an obligation, or between two
obligations.
We expected participants prompted to imagine
fulfilling an internal desire (going on a holiday) over an
obligation (seeking expert diagnosis for suspected
melanoma) would anticipate significantly more regret
than participants prompted to make the opposite choice.
We expected no differences in anticipated regret
between participants told they had to choose between
two competing obligations (attending an interstate
family funeral vs. seeking expert diagnosis for
suspected melanoma).
We also asked how participants believed they would
have acted had they actually been in the situation
described. We expected participants would indicate
they would have chosen the action opposite to what was
depicted (i.e., the action that would have avoided the
negative outcome), especially if the outcome resulted
from choosing to fulfill a desire over an obligation.
Participants told to imagine they chose to fulfill a health
obligation over a desire were not expected to say they
would have made the choice opposite to what was
described (i.e., to go on the holiday and skip getting
their skin checked for cancer) as missing out on a
holiday in return for peace of mind that their health is in
good condition may seem worthwhile. At most we
expected participants in this condition to demonstrate
only a slight preference for going on the holiday over
getting their skin checked. For participants who were
told they had to choose between fulfilling two
obligations it was expected that they would choose to
avoid the salient outcome by choosing the action
opposite to what was prescribed.

Method
Participants
The participants were 120 psychology students (male:
27; female: 93). The ages of the participants ranged
from 17.67 to 52.25 years, with a mean age of 22.87
years. Participants took part in the experiment on a
voluntary basis after providing written informed
consent. Recruitment of participants and all research
activities for this study were in accordance with
protocol approved by the University of Wollongong
Human Research Ethics Committee.
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Design and materials
The experiment employed a 2 (reason for action) x 2
(salient outcome) between-subjects factorial design.
This resulted in four experimental conditions. However,
two additional control conditions were also included to
assess participants’ baseline preferences for the given
behavioural options. Hence, participants were randomly
allocated to read one of six different stories (n=20)
which manipulated event saliency and reason for action
and were designed to elicit anticipated counterfactual
regret. One of two core story versions could be
presented, which varied according to the nature of the
event that competed with a decision to check up on a
suspected case of melanoma: one where the competing
choice was to fulfill an internal desire (internal desire
version [IDV]), the other to fulfill a social obligation
(social obligation version [SOV]). In the SOV we chose
to pit the health obligation against a social obligation to
create enough of a difference between the competing
choices while still maintaining an obligatory status.
Participants were told that due to financial constraints,
they could only afford to choose to fulfill either the
health obligation or the “other” option (i.e., the social
obligation or internal desire). Within each of the two
story versions there were three separate conditions: two
experimental conditions in which one of two different
outcomes could be made salient, and a control condition
in which no such saliency manipulation was made so
baseline preferences for each action could be assessed.
In each experimental condition, it was made clear the
outcome resulted from choosing to fulfill an internal
desire, a social obligation or a health obligation.
Participants who received the IDV core story were
told that they had to make a choice between getting a
suspicious looking mole on their arm checked by a
dermatologist (health obligation) and going on a ‘oncein-a-lifetime’ trip with friends (internal desire). Event
saliency was manipulated by either instructing them to
imagine that they had chosen to go on the trip with
friends to later find out that the mole was cancerous, or
that they had chosen to get their skin checked out to
find that it was benign and they hence, missed out on
the trip.
Participants who received the SOV core story were
told that they had to choose between getting their skin
checked for cancer (health obligation) and attending a
much loved family member’s interstate funeral (social
obligation). They were then either told to imagine that
they had chosen to attend the funeral to later be
diagnosed with cancer, or that they had chosen to get
their skin checked to find it was benign and they hence,
missed out on saying goodbye to a loved one. We chose
to focus the health obligation choice in each condition
around a hypothetical skin cancer scenario due to the
high prevalence of this cancer type in Australian
society, and its ability to affect people of all ages,
ethnicities and genders (Cancer Council Australia,
2003).

Procedure
Participants took part in the study either individually or
in small groups with up to three other people.
After providing informed consent participants were
randomly assigned to read one of the six story versions
(n=20). Afterwards participants were required to
respond to questions related to their story version. The
participants in the experimental conditions were firstly
required to answer a question related to how much
regret they anticipate they would feel in relation to the
highlighted potential story outcome. They responded on
a seven point rating scale ranging from ‘very regretful’
(7) to ‘not at all regretful’ (1), with an ‘undecided’
option available as the mid-point. Control participants
did not receive this initial question. Subsequently all
participants answered a question related to which
course of action they would have taken had they
actually been in the situation. They indicated their
response on a three-point categorical response scale
with ‘get your mole checked with a dermatologist’ on
one end of the scale and either ‘go on interstate holiday
with your friends’ (IDV) or ‘go interstate to attend the
family funeral’ (SOV) on the other end. Unlike Hetts et
al. (2000), who employed a two option forced response
format for this question, an ‘undecided’ option was also
included in the current experiment as it was
hypothesised this may represent a legitimate category
of people who were genuinely undecided. In total the
experiment took around 10 minutes to complete. Upon
completion of the task participants were debriefed.

Results
All analyses were evaluated against an alpha level of
.05. A 2 (reason for action) x 2 (salient outcome)
univariate ANOVA was conducted on mean regret
ratings.
The means for regret ratings for the four experimental
groups can be found in Figure 1. A main effect of
saliency was found, F(1, 77)= 52.28, p=.000. A
significant interaction was also found between reason
for action and event saliency, F(1,77)= 7.37, p=.008.
Upon examination of the simple effects it was found
that there was a significant difference in the amount of
regret felt between the internal desire and health
obligation groups (MD=2.41, SE=.42, p=.000); however
there was no significant difference between the amount
of regret felt between the social obligation and health
obligation groups (MD=.80, SE=.42, p=.062),
supporting our hypothesis.
A chi-square analysis was conducted to examine the
relationship between the story condition and the action
participants indicated they would have taken were they
actually in the situation. This analysis was done on the
control and experimental groups separately. The
percentages of control participants’ responding can be
found in Figure 2. A significant difference in
responding was found between the two control groups,
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Figure 2: Participants’ anticipated choice of behaviour by
core story version for each control condition.
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Figure 3: Participants anticipated choice of behaviour by
story version and experimental condition.
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χ2(2)=10.98, p=004. Results indicate that baseline
preferences for participants who read the IDV story
were more likely to say they would get their skin
checked for cancer than go on the holiday with friends.
For participants who received the SOV, story responses
were more evenly spread between ‘get your mole
checked with dermatologist’ and ‘go interstate to attend
the family funeral’ (χ2(2)=1.97, p=.740). This finding is
consistent the reason for action prediction, i.e., that
participants would be more likely to avoid anticipated
counterfactual regret especially if it resulted from
choosing to fulfill a desire over an obligation.
Participants who had to choose between fulfilling two
obligations did not clearly identify one response option
that would avoid greater feelings of anticipated
counterfactual regret.
The percentages of the actions chosen for each
experimental condition can be found in Figure 3. No
significant difference in responding was found for the
experimental groups where participants had to choose
between fulfilling an internal desire or an external
obligation, χ2(2)=.31, p=.857, nor was a significant
difference found when the participants had to choose
between fulfilling two obligations, χ2(2)=.47, p=.792.
Although these results show that participants were more
likely to indicate they would have acted in a manner
which would have avoided the salient outcome, these
results did not reach significance. Compared to the
control groups, the results were more evenly spread
between the two response options for both the IDV and
SOV groups. Within each experimental group, there
were also a sizeable proportion of participants choosing
the “undecided” option. These results indicate that the
combination of event saliency and reason for action
does not significantly make participants want to avoid
the salient counterfactual outcome had they been in that
situation.

Other regret

Discussion

5
4
3
2
1
0
IOV

SOV
Core story version

Figure 1: Ratings for the four experimental conditions.
“Other” refers to either internal desire or social obligation.
Error bars represent ±1 units of standard error.

This experiment explored how event saliency and
reason for action may influence the amount of regret
anticipated about a foregone option and on people’s
anticipated choice of behaviour in a health related
context. Consistent with our expectations, when having
to choose between two competing actions, both with the
potential to result in a bad outcome, making a choice to
fulfill an internal desire over an obligation increases the
amount of regret felt. Less regret is felt if a negative
outcome resulted from choosing to fulfill one obligation
over another. This information can hopefully be applied
to health promotion campaigns. Recent campaigns have
aimed to encourage people to go for cancer screening
even when there are other competing external
obligations. For example, the campaign entitled “Breast
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cancer won’t wait. Everything else can” aims to place
health obligations before any other types of obligation
(National Breast and Ovarian Cancer Centre, 2008).
However, based on the results of this experiment,
messages may be effective if they emphasise that it is
more important to take care of one’s health than to
fulfill competing desires that may sometimes be viewed
as high-priority obligations.
The results show that saliency and reason for action
do not significantly influence participants’ anticipated
choice of action in the manner expected. Hetts et al.
(2000) found that participants were more likely to
choose an action that avoided the described negative
outcome when event saliency alone was manipulated.
We expected that participants in the IDV groups who
were told that they chose to fulfill an internal desire
over an obligation would be more likely to indicate they
would chose to get their skin checked out for cancer
rather than go on a holiday with friends. For
participants who imagined that they fulfilled a health
obligation over a desire we expected responses to be
more evenly spread, but with a slight preference for
going on the holiday with friends. For participants in
both of the SOV groups we expected participants who
were told that they went to the funeral and ended up
with skin cancer to indicate they would get their skin
checked by the dermatologist; and for participants who
were told they got their skin checked for cancer and
missed out on the family funeral to indicate they would
have chosen to go to the funeral. However, in our
experimental groups participants did not readily choose
the action that would have avoided the outcome and
hence, the associated counterfactual regret. This finding
suggests that getting people to imagine the reasons for
action makes them think about the possible factors that
could influence the situation (such as competing
obligations and desires) and prevent them from carrying
out the action. When trying to persuade people to take
an action (such as preventative health checks) it may
not merely be enough to get them to think about the
negative outcomes of and regret caused by an action (or
inaction), it is also important to get them to consider the
wider context (particularly reasons for action) and get
them to work through any barriers that may be present,
as these undoubtedly will arise in real life.
At this point the limitations of this study need to be
addressed. Placing the “undecided” response option as a
midpoint on the continuous rating scale which
examined how much regret was felt may have
confounded results. The responses ranged from “not at
all regretful” to “very regretful” so have an “undecided”
response as a midpoint may indicate that there is some
regret felt. Instead of placing this “undecided” option as
a midpoint it should have been placed next to the scale,
rather than be included within it. Based on the lack of
significant difference between the four experimental
conditions on anticipated behaviour it may be that the
scenarios were not properly tapping into (possibly

demographic) appropriate constructs. Alternatively the
results may have been confounded by the presence of
an ‘undecided’ response option. The high prevalence of
participants indicating they were “undecided” portrays
the dilemma participants faced in the scenarios. In order
to gain a better understanding of the effects of event
saliency and reason for action on anticipated behaviour,
it may be better to provide a two-alternative forced
response for this question as in the Hetts et al. (2000)
study. Hence, further validation of the testing materials
and response options is necessary before any definite
conclusions about the joint effects of event saliency and
reason for action on decision making can be made.
Research also needs to be done with a community
sample to enhance ecological utility so that findings can
be generalized to the wider community.
In conclusion, the current experiment allowed a
preliminary investigation using a complex paradigm
which examined the interaction between event saliency
and reason for action and the effects of these variables
on anticipated regret and behaviour in a health related
context. Pending further investigation and validation of
testing materials, the principles governing human
judgment about salient outcomes and reasons for
actions can hopefully be applied to preventative health
campaigns to improve population health outcomes.
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